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GRAND JURY
N. Y. CONST. art. I, § 6:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise in-
famous crime... , unless on indictment of a grand jury, except
that a person held for the action of a grand jury upon a charge
for such an offense, other than one punishable by death or life
imprisonment, with the consent of the district attorney, may waive
indictment by grand jury and consent to be prosecuted on an in-
formation filed by the district attorney; such waiver shall be evi-
denced by written instrument signed by the defendant in open
court in the presence of his counsel.
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise




(decided April 26, 1990)
Defendant, after having served his sentence, sought vacatur of
his plea to be prosecuted under a superior court information
(SCI) on two charges that were added to his indictment upon his
consent. The defendant claimed that his "waiver of indictment
was impermissible" 732 under both the Criminal Procedure Law
(CPL) section 195.10733 and the New York State
Constitution,73 4 which allows for a waiver of a grand jury
indictment upon the consent of the defendant, the court, and the
People. In a unanimous decision, the court of appeals held in
731. 75 N.Y.2d 585, 554 N.E.2d 64, 555 N.Y.S.2d 27 (1990).
732. Id. at 587, 554 N.E.2d at 66, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 29.
733. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 195.10 (McKinney 1982).
734. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6.
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favor of the defendant "as a matter of statutory
interpretation." ' 735 The court found that it was contrary to the
objectives of CPL 195.10 to waive a grand jury indictment and
proceed with a prosecution by incorporating an SCI into an
already existing indictment.
Defendant was indicted by a grand jury for attempted murder
in the second degree under an intentional murder theory, as well
as other charges arising out of the same incident. After arraign-
ment, and with the consent of the parties and the court, the
People filed an SCI charging defendant with second degree mur-
der, under a depraved indifference theory. 736 The defendant, his
attorney, the People, and the court consented to the defendant's
waiver of a grand jury indictment and, instead, proceeded with
an SCI prosecution. The trial court consolidated the SCI into the
original indictment and the defendant was convicted on both
murder counts and first degree assault. The defendant was sen-
tenced to two concurrent, indeterminate terms of imprison-
ment. 737
The right to an indictment by a grand jury has been recognized
by state common law as a "public fundamental right." 738
However, a New York State constitutional provision, enacted in
1974 as an amendment to article I, section 6 of the New York
State Constitution,739 allows a criminal defendant being
prosecuted under state law to waive his or her right to an
indictment and "'consent to be prosecuted on an information filed
by the district attorney,"' and "'such waiver shall be evidenced
by written instrument signed by the defendant in open court in
735. Boston, 75 N.Y.2d at 587, 554 N.E.2d at 66, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 29.
736. Id. (citing N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25(2) (McKinney 1987 & Supp.
1990)).
737. Id.
738. Id. (citing Simonson v. Calm, 27 N.Y.2d 1, 261 N.E.2d 246, 313
N.Y.S.2d 97 (1970); People v. Miles, 289 N.Y. 360, 45 N.E.2d 910 (1942);
People ex rel. Battista v. Christian, 249 N.Y. 314, 164 N.E. 111 (1928)).
739. The court noted that the constitution originally "declare[ed] that no
person shall be held to answer for an infamous crime unless upon indictment of
the Grand Jury" and that there were no exceptions. Id. The court emphasized
the importance of narrowly construing the new provision. Id.
1991]
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the presence of his counsel.' 740 Subsequently, the legislature
enacted CPL section 195.10, which specifies when a defendant
may be prosecuted under an SCI rather than a grand jury
indictment. 741
The Boston court found that CPL section 195.10(2)(b) was of
such "critical significance," 742 that waiver of the indictment
must be exercised "prior to the filing of an indictment by the
grand jury." 743 The court determined that this legislation
"plainly and explicitly preclude[s] waiver by' SCI after an
indictment is filed. ' ' 744 The court reasoned that the statute was
implemented as a time saving device. "The statutory procedures
were thus aimed at affording a defendant the opportunity for a
speedier disposition of charges as well as eliminating unnecessary
Grand Jury proceedings."-745 Therefore, since defendant's waiver
and plea occurred after his indictment, the court held that his
conviction must be set aside.746
Although there is no federal constitutional provision for waiver
of a grand jury indictment in favor of pleading guilty to an in-
formation, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure section 7(b) 747
does provide for such an option in particular circumstances. 748 In
740. Id. at 588, 554 N.E.2d at 66, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 29 (quoting N.Y.
CONST. art. I, § 6).
741. N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAW § 195.10(1) (McKinney 1982). The statute
provides that:
A defendant may waive indictment and consent to be prosecuted by
superior court information when: (a) a local criminal court has held the
defendant for the action of a grand jury; and (b) the defendant is not
charged with a class A felony; and (c) the district attorney consents to
the waiver.
Id.
742. Boston, 75 N.Y.2d at 588, 544 N.E.2d at 66, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 29.
743. Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §
195.10(2)(b) (McKinney 1982)).
744. Id.
745. Id. at 589, 554 N.E.2d at 67, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 30 (citations omitted).
746. Id.
747. FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(b).
748. Fed. R. CRIM. P. 7(b) provides:
Waiver of Indictment. An offense which may be punished by
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year or at hard labor may be
360 [Vol 8
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1931, a federal district court established that the right to waive an
indictment by a grand jury is a personal privilege and, like other
personal rights or privileges, it may be waived by a defendant. 749
More recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit stated that a written waiver of indictment by a grand jury
is unnecessary where a defendant affirmatively seeks the waiver
and an instruction to the jury of a lesser charge. 750 Also, in
Ornelas v. United States,751 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit acknowledged a defendant's right to
plead guilty to an information if it is done in open court. 752
Additionally, such a waiver need not be express; it may be
implied. In Ornelas, the defendants were in the course of their
trial when they decided against risking an unfavorable jury
verdict. They subsequently pleaded to an information of a lesser
charge. The court held that the failure to obtain an express waiver
under the circumstances was "a mere technical violation of Rule
7(b)." 753
The New York Court of Appeals in Boston, relying primarily
prosecuted by information if the defendant, after having been advised of
the nature of the charge and rights of the defendant, waives in open
court prosecution by indictment.
Id.
749. In United States v. Gill, 55 F.2d 399 (D.N.M. 1931). The district
court noted that it would:
[Slee no force in the argument that the accused may waive a trial by a
jury and not waive the other constitutional privilege of having the
accusation against him first passed upon and found by a grand jury. If
his waiver is effective in the one instance, it must be in the other. Both
provisions are provisions made for the benefit of the accused, and both
are subject to that fundamental rule of law that a person may renounce a
provision made for his benefit ....
Id. at 401; see also Barkman v. Sanford, where the court noted that "[ilt
seems thoroughly established that an intelligent accused may waive any
constitutional right that is in the nature of a privilege to him, or that is for his
personal protection or benefit." 162 F.2d 592, 594 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
332 U.S. 816 (1947).
750. United States v. Ferguson, 758 F.2d 843, 852 (2d Cir. 1985).
751. 840 F.2d 890 (11th Cir. 1988).
752. Id. at 892.
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upon the purpose behind the SCI provision in the CPL statute,
concluded that because the statute and constitutional provisions
are time saving devices and an aid in eliminating unnecessary
grand jury proceedings, it was inconsistent to allow for such a
waiver after grand jury proceedings have already taken place. On
the federal level, although an information has not particularly
been referred to as a time saving device, courts have at least rec-
ognized the constitutionality of a waiver of indictment in favor of
prosecution based on an information. Thus, an information has
been held to be constitutional on both the federal and state levels.
People v. Menchetti754
(decided September 19, 1990)
Defendant challenged the validity of the superior court
information, 755 to which he pleaded guilty, on the grounds that
the information charged him with a different offense than that in
the felony complaint for which he was being held for grand jury
indictment. The defendant alternatively alleged that even if the
information may properly charge a defendant with a lesser in-
cluded offense than that in the felony complaint, the information
in question is still defective because criminal possession in the
fourth degree is not a lesser included offense of criminal posses-
sion in the third degree.
The court of appeals held that the superior court information
(SCI) was valid because the information can charge a defendant
with a lesser included offense so long as the defendant is also
being charged with that lesser included offense in the felony
complaint. 756 Moreover, the court held that criminal possession
in the fourth degree is a lesser included offense of criminal
possession in the third degree, because one cannot commit
criminal possession in the third degree without simultaneously
committing criminal possession in the fourth degree. 757
754. 76 N.Y.2d 473, 561 N.E.2d 536, 560 N.Y.S.2d 760 (1990).
755. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 195.10(1) (McKinney 1982).
756. Menchetti, 76 N.Y.2d at 478, 561 N.E.2d at 539, 560 N.Y.S.2d at
763.
757. Id. (citing People v. Glover, 57 N.Y.2d 61, 64, 439 N.E.2d 376, 377,
[Vol 8
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